the data and theory that he has assimilated for the reader.

Besides mastering a genre of explication, any textbook author must overcome the dilemma of writing about the subject and the means of analysis simultaneously. Wood switches effortlessly between the two throughout his book, moving from intuitive and common examples of children's thinking to empirical analyses of the phenomena. Readers are given concrete examples of problems that children confront, are shown how psychologists study them, and then are provided with reasonable explanations, free of the jargon and with sparing use of references. This style allows the reader to navigate the issues in the landscape of the field of cognitive development without losing sight of the child.

The second half of the book examines a variety of topics within three broad themes of language, literacy, and mathematical thinking. The examples of children’s thinking are drawn from school and home settings and range from young children to adolescence. Wood avoids dividing the child's thinking according to research paradigms and topics. Instead, he embeds many important accomplishments, such as self-regulated learning and behavior, into his explanations. The sense of the whole child pervades the writing rather than a summary of research topics. Some readers, like travelers anywhere, may be disappointed that their favorite topics were not highlighted on the itinerary (e.g., science) or that the tour guide had a deducedly British perspective on the sights. However, I think most readers, on completion of the book, will have a sense of satisfaction in the coherent view of the child's development and thinking. They will appreciate historical changes in the landscape they traversed and be satisfied with the comfort and length of the trip. It should whet their appetites for further explorations in psychology and education, a sure sign of an appetites for further explorations in psychology and education, a sure sign of an enjoyable experience.

References


Genuine Social Psychology: Investigations by Mind and Group

Intergroup Cognition and Intergroup Behavior

by Constantine Sedikides, John Schopler, and Chester A. Insko (Eds.)


Review by J. Richard Hackman and Mahzarin R. Banaji

The search to understand human behavior has, in recent years, taken a turn that we find heartening. There appears to be, across psychology, increasing recognition that robust and useful explanations of human behavior can emerge from crossing traditional levels of analysis. Instead of satisfaction with explanations at any single level, psychologists seem to be incorporating in their interpretive models mechanisms that operate one level “down” and contextual forces that operate one level “up” from their focal phenomenon.

The signs of this development are many and diverse. The recent Behavioral Science Task Force of the National Institute of Mental Health is redesigning its peer review structure by level of analysis. In social psychology, the forthcoming Blackwell Handbooks are explicitly organized in terms of similar levels (Heckwone & Brewer, in press). Both of these initiatives provide recognition that psychological phenomena are meaningfully identified as belonging to specific levels of analysis. Recent initiatives at Harvard University and the University of Michigan further suggest that robust understanding of human behavior may require the crossing of levels. Harvard has reorganized its undergraduate concentration in psychology with mainline courses, which address processes that characterize persons qua persons, bracketed both by courses that probe within-person mechanisms and others that address the between-person context of behavior. Psychologists in the Department of Psychology at the University of Michigan, in collaboration with colleagues in other departments including anthropology, have mounted a research and educational program on culture and cognition that seeks to bridge the gap between intra-individual and collective phenomena.

These developments attest to a truth that psychologists sometimes overlook as they delve ever deeper into their own phenomena—namely, that processes operating within individuals always interact with factors that exist among individuals in shaping the behaviors that are exhibited by individuals. Intergroup Cognition and Intergroup Behavior is an excellent demonstration of the benefits of taking that truth seriously in analyzing intergroup cognition and behavior. The book also reveals, more by what is not in it than by the character of what is in it, that those in the field still have a long way to go in learning how to construct genuinely cross-level explanations—even for phenomena such as intergroup behavior that seem naturally to invite, if not require, such analyses.

There is an asymmetry in how easy it is to move down versus up in constructing explanations. Scientists generally like to turn to lower levels of analysis to identify the mechanisms that drive their phenomena. In social psychology, this strategy has been enormously productive. As is seen in Parts II and III of this book, which address cognitive processes that affect how people perceive and judge groups, even complex and hard-to-pin-down phenomena, such as prejudice, stereotyping, and intergroup conflict have yielded to reductive analytic tools skillfully applied by scholars of social cognition. Insko and Schopler, for example, summa-
rize a productive program of research exploring why intergroup relations are, on the whole, more competitive than interindividual relations. They explain this phenomenon in terms of cognitive schemas that generate greater distrust (or fear) of groups than of individuals. In the next chapter, joined by Sedikides, they drop down one more level of analysis and propose an evolutionary basis for that differential distrust.

Other chapters in these two parts of the book stay mostly at the cognitive level. Linville and Fischer, for example, provide a comprehensive review of evidence showing that people generally tend to view members of other groups as more homogeneous than members of their own group. They then identify the circumstances when the outgroup homogeneity effect is not likely to be found, and offer a new model to explain the pattern of findings about intergroup perceptions that they have summarized. Other chapters also provide comprehensive and informative assessments of what is known about the determinants of intergroup cognition, attesting to the power of cognitive methods and theories in illuminating the dynamics of thoughts, feelings, and (mostly by extrapolation) behaviors vis-à-vis other groups.

However, relatively few chapters explicitly incorporate contextual features as part of the explanation of intergroup cognition or behavior. As tends generally to be true in psychology, properties of the context are more often viewed as possible restrictions on the external validity of some set of research findings than as part of explanation qua explanation. A few chapters, especially in Part III (on motivational and social influences on intergroup cognition and behavior), do draw on contextual features in explaining how people relate to other groups. In their discussion of member socialization and intergroup relations, for example, Levine, Moreland, and Ryan helpfully complexify the standard ingroup-outgroup paradigm by noting that individuals can have simultaneous membership in multiple groups (a matter whose implications are analyzed in depth in a subsequent chapter by Miller, Urban, and Vanman), that groups frequently compete for members and their loyalty, and that intergroup relations often involve three or more groups in interaction, not just two. The ecological distribution of groups and members is consequential for any robust understanding of intergroup cognition and behavior, and this chapter begins to lay the groundwork for scholarly attention to that matter.

Ecological features also play a key role in Kramer and Messick’s explanation of the origins and dynamics of collective paranoia. Consistent with the social-cognitive approach of the book as a whole, these authors use a social information processing model to analyze the proximal causes of the distrust and suspicion that commonly develops between intact groups. These authors’ innovation is to note that these proximal causes themselves stem from a feature of the context—namely, the degree to which groups are in a hierarchical relationship characterized by an asymmetry of power and status. That state of affairs, which is a highly prevalent form of social organization, also spawns precisely the kinds of cognitive processes which, in turn, give rise to collective paranoia.

The power of cross-level analysis is perhaps most evident in Claire and Fiske’s compelling analysis of the conditions under which stereotypes are (and are not) enacted in social interaction by those that are stereotyped. These authors identify a number of contextual features, prominently including the preexisting power relationship among the interactants and the properties of the social networks of which both perceivers (i.e., those who hold the stereotype) and targets are members. By attending simultaneously to cognitive processes, interpersonal dynamics, and properties of the social context, Clare and Fiske are able to generate insightful and testable propositions about the conditions under which stereotypes become self-confirming and self-sustaining.

That there is much more attention paid in this book to cognitive processes than to contextual features reflects both the editors’ explicit purpose and the state of knowledge about intergroup cognition and behavior. But this emphasis may also reflect social psychologists’ uneasiness, or lack of experience, in working with collective-level concepts. This possibility is most vividly illustrated in the book by the laboration attempts, by many authors in many chapters, to come up with a useful conception of just what a group actually is. The most extensive definitional discussion is provided early in the book by Wilder and Simon, who suggest there are two ways to define a group: a categorical definition, in which group membership is determined by those who possess certain specified characteristics, and a dynamic definition, in which group membership arises out of the relations among members—that is, who interacts with whom. Hamilton, Sherman, and Lickel, in a later chapter, draw much the same distinction and then tell us not to worry too much about it: “Everyone understands that when one researcher talks about group decision-making and another talks about a stereotype of a group, the term group is referring to quite different entities in the two cases” (p. 67).

Other authors have their own go at the matter in other chapters. Yet none of them, and despite the fact that this book is about intergroup cognition and behavior, includes anything about relations among groups (as contrasted with relations among individual members) in their conception of the focal entity. Consider, by way of contrast, the conception of groups suggested by Alderfer (1977), who studies relations among functional and demographic groups in organizational settings.

A human group is a collection of individuals (1) who have significantly interdependent relations with each other, (2) who perceive themselves as a group by reliably distinguishing members from nonmembers, (3) whose group identity is recognized by nonmembers, (4) who have differentiated roles in the group as a function of expectations from themselves, other group members, and nonmembers, and (5) who, as group members acting alone or in concert, have significantly independent relations with other groups. (p. 230)

For Alderfer, then, if there are no intergroup relations, there is no group—a rather nonintuitive proposition that is, nonetheless, rich in implication for research and theory on intergroup behavior. As noted in a fine concluding chapter by Mackie and Smith, there is little behavior in the chapters of this book on intergroup cognition and behavior. That is perhaps not altogether surprising, given that the conceptions of the concept group used by virtually all the authors do not characterize groups as behaving entities—that is, as entitative.

A prominent feature of this book, and one that will perhaps be its lasting contribution, is the analysis of the conditions under which groups are perceived as groups that are capable of acting. The field has rediscovered Campbell’s (1958) concept of entitativity, and the chapters that pay homage to this construct present among the most original theses. They are not just summaries of past literatures but instead break new ground. The chapters by Hamilton, Sherman, and Lickel and by Insko, Schopler, and Sedikides are rich in new analyses about what it is about groups that give them the quality of strong groupness. Campbell was correct to point out that social groups do not lend themselves to the same perception of realness as physical objects such as stones and tea cups do, with boundaries that are less sharp and the feel of a thing less solid.
Yet, he argues, "My proposal is that we look to the empirical clues of entity used in the visual perception of middle-sized physical entities and then employ these clues in the analysis of social aggregates as entities" (p. 17). The advice appears to be well-accepted in these chapters as well as in other recent works (e.g., Abelson, Dasgupta, Park, & Banaji, 1998; Yzerbyt, Rogier, & Fiske, 1998). Its promise is to advance thinking about one of the most fundamental questions in social psychology: What is it that makes a social aggregate a real group? And what are the consequences, for perceivers and for target, of perceiving an entity to be a group? This is an important volume. It integrates and, in many ways advances, knowledge about intergroup phenomena. But analysis does not suffice for psychologists; they are also committed to actively promote human welfare. To what extent might the chapters of this book guide and inform action to deal with intergroup problems in society? The answer, realistically but sadly, is not much. An exception is the chapter by Hewstone and Lord, which provides something of a model for how action implications can flow from rigorous scholarly analyses. Although explicitly about typicality in intergroup cognitions, this chapter provides what may be the most conceptually sound and practically useful assessment of the contact hypothesis to be found in the literature. There are other chapters that help lay the groundwork for constructive social action, to be sure. Simon's chapter titled "Individuals, Groups, and Social Change" provides solid guidance about when individuals are likely to join movements that are working toward social change. Biernat, Vesco, and Manis show by Richard H. Dana


References


Understanding Cultural Identity in Intervention and Assessment

by Richard H. Dana


Teaching About Culture, Ethnicity, & Diversity: Exercises and Planned Activities

by Theodore M. Singelis (Ed.)


Review by Joseph G. Ponterotto

In the early 1990s, one of the most influential psychology scholars of the second half of the 20th century, Paul B. Pedersen, characterized the increasing momentum of multiculturalism in the profession as the "fourth force" in psychology. Pedersen (1991) claimed that the burgeoning multicultural emphasis would have as great an impact on the psychology field as had the earlier psychodynamic, existential and humanistic, and behavioral movements. Pedersen had

Richard H. Dana, Mentor Research Institute, Portland, Oregon.

Theodore M. Singelis, Department of Psychology, California State University, Chico.

Joseph G. Ponterotto, Division of Psychological and Educational Services, Fordham University.

Multiculturalism, Psychology, and the 21st Century

Understanding Cultural Identity in Intervention and Assessment

by Richard H. Dana


Teaching About Culture, Ethnicity, & Diversity: Exercises and Planned Activities

by Theodore M. Singelis (Ed.)


Review by Joseph G. Ponterotto

In the early 1990s, one of the most influential psychology scholars of the second half of the 20th century, Paul B. Pedersen, characterized the increasing momentum of multiculturalism in the profession as the "fourth force" in psychology. Pedersen (1991) claimed that the burgeoning multicultural emphasis would have as great an impact on the psychology field as had the earlier psychodynamic, existential and humanistic, and behavioral movements. Pedersen had

Richard H. Dana, Mentor Research Institute, Portland, Oregon.

Theodore M. Singelis, Department of Psychology, California State University, Chico.

Joseph G. Ponterotto, Division of Psychological and Educational Services, Fordham University.